ORIGINAL PAPER
Civilian technologies as improvised military tools in asymmetric conflict
 
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General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Poland
 
 
A - Research concept and design; B - Collection and/or assembly of data; C - Data analysis and interpretation; D - Writing the article; E - Critical revision of the article; F - Final approval of article
 
 
Submission date: 2026-04-06
 
 
Final revision date: 2026-04-10
 
 
Acceptance date: 2026-05-27
 
 
Online publication date: 2026-07-31
 
 
Publication date: 2026-07-31
 
 
NSZ 2026;21(3):109-122
 
KEYWORDS
ABSTRACT
Research objectives and hypothesis/research questions:
The study aims to identify the mechanisms through which civilian digital technologies were transformed into improvised military tools and to determine the organizational conditions, operational advantages, and limitations of this adaptation process within the Ukrainian defense system. Hypothesis: The research hypothesizes that the effectiveness of adapting civilian COTS technologies in asymmetric warfare depends on three measurable dimensions: (1) shortening the decision-making/OODA loop, (2) shortening logistical cycles, and (3) reducing unit costs and barriers to entry compared to dedicated military systems, while simultaneously increasing vulnerability to information security risks.

Research methods:
The study applies a qualitative research framework combining desk research and case study analysis. The desk research component is based on a systematic review of institutional defense reports (e.g., NATO, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine), academic literature, and industry publications related to military innovation, organizational resilience, dynamic capabilities, and bricolage. The case study method focuses on the operational implementation of selected civilian technologies in wartime conditions, including communication platforms (Discord, Google Meet, WhatsApp), logistics and HR systems (DOT-Chain, SAP, Lobby X), and digital battlefield coordination tools. The analysis is theoretically grounded in the concepts of Dynamic Capabilities, organizational bricolage, and organizational resilience.

Main results:
The findings indicate that widely available civilian technologies significantly accelerated operational responsiveness and decentralized decision-making processes. Communication platforms enabled rapid coordination and reduced command latency, while digital logistics systems shortened supply cycles and reduced bureaucratic inefficiencies. Low-cost and easily accessible technologies lowered training requirements and expanded operational scalability. At the same time, dependence on commercial digital infrastructure increased exposure to cyber threats, electronic surveillance, and information security vulnerabilities.

Implications for theory and practice:
Civilian COTS technologies can serve as resilient, scalable, and cost-effective substitutes for conventional military systems in asymmetric conflicts. Their effectiveness is strongly linked to organizational flexibility, improvisation capacity, and the ability to rapidly reconfigure available resources. However, the long-term integration of civilian technologies into military structures requires addressing cybersecurity vulnerabilities and strategic risks associated with dual-use commercial platforms.
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ISSN:1896-9380
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