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## The impact of migration of Ukrainian citizens on various aspects of the security of selected European Union countries

### Wpływ migracji obywateli Ukrainy na różne aspekty bezpieczeństwa wybranych państw Unii Europejskiej

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#### Abstract:

##### *Research objectives and hypothesis/research questions*

The study outlines the research problem of how to address the migration of Ukrainians in Poland and what actions should be implemented to benefit European Union countries. The aim of the study is a multidimensional analysis and evaluation of data on the number of Ukrainians benefiting from temporary protection in European countries and their impact on demographics, the economy, and social security. This article proposes a research hypothesis: it is assumed that the largest number of Ukrainians benefiting from temporary protection resulting from the war with Russia was in Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which influenced the demography of these countries, as well as the labour market and education systems.

##### *Research methods*

The research method used in the paper is a source analysis, including inference techniques.

##### *Main results*

This article analyzes and evaluates data on migrants from Ukraine benefiting from temporary protection in Europe, as well as their impact on demographics, the economy, and social security from March 2022 to August 2025. Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic accepted the largest number of refugees, demonstrating the unequal burden-sharing among European Union member states following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Since 2023, the number of people under protection has been stabilizing, indicating an adjustment in refugee reception and integration systems.

**Implications for theory and practice**

To capitalize on migration in the future, a consistent and long-term integration policy is essential. Member States should facilitate migrants' access to the labour market, education and language learning, recognize professional qualifications and support entrepreneurship among refugees. It is also crucial to ensure adequate housing, healthcare and psychological care, as well as promote social dialogue to reduce the risk of exclusion and cultural tensions. The European Union ought to continue to work together and fund integration policies to ensure that the burden of assistance is shared evenly among Member States.

**Keywords:**

migration, security, social security, demography, education system

**Abstrakt:****Cel badań i hipotezy/pytania badawcze**

W opracowaniu rozważono problem badawczy: w jaki sposób sprostac zjawisku migracji Ukraińców w Polsce i jakie działania wdrożyć, aby przyniosła ona korzyści państwu Unii Europejskiej? Celem badań jest wielowymiarowa analiza i ocena danych dotyczących liczby osób z Ukrainy korzystających z ochrony czasowej w krajach europejskich i ich wpływu na demografię, gospodarkę oraz bezpieczeństwo społeczne. W artykule postawiono hipotezę badawczą: przypuszcza się, że najwięcej Ukraińców korzystających z ochrony czasowej wywołanej wojną z Rosją było w Niemczech, Polsce i Czechach, co wpłynęło na demografię tych państw, a także na rynek pracy i system edukacji.

**Metody badawcze**

W tekście zastosowano metodę badawczą w postaci analizy źródłowej, w tym technikę wnioskowania.

**Główne wyniki**

W artykule wykonano analizę i ocenę danych dotyczących osób będących migrantami z Ukrainy i korzystających z ochrony czasowej w Europie, a także ich wpływu na demografię, gospodarkę i bezpieczeństwo społeczne od marca 2022 r. do sierpnia 2025 r. Najwięcej uchodźców przyjęły Niemcy, Polska i Czechy, co pokazuje nierówny podział obciążeń między państwami Unii Europejskiej po wybuchu wojny w Ukrainie. Od 2023 roku liczba osób objętych ochroną stabilizuje się, co świadczy o dostosowaniu systemów przyjmowania i integracji uchodźców.

**Implikacje dla teorii i praktyki**

Aby w przyszłości skorzystać na zjawisku migracji, konieczna jest konsekwentna i długofalowa polityka integracyjna. Państwa członkowskie powinny ułatwiać migrantom dostęp do rynku pracy, edukacji i nauki języka, uznawać kwalifikacje zawodowe oraz wspierać przedsiębiorczość wśród uchodźców. Ważne jest też zapewnienie odpowiednich warunków mieszkaniowych, opieki zdrowotnej i psychologicznej, a także promowanie dialogu społecznego, który ograniczy ryzyko wykluczenia i napięć kulturowych. Unia Europejska powinna natomiast kontynuować wspólne działania i finansowanie polityk integracyjnych, tak by ciężar pomocy był rozłożony równomiernie między państwa członkowskie.

**Słowa kluczowe:**

migracja, bezpieczeństwo, bezpieczeństwo społeczne, demografia, system edukacji

## Introduction

Migration from Ukraine is a phenomenon of significant importance for Poland and the entire European Union, as it affects the economy, demography, and social security (Kozicki, Bryczek-Wróbel, 2020; Kozicki, 2022; Kozicki, Mitkow, 2021). For Poland, the influx of Ukrainians meant strengthening the labour market, mitigating the effects of an aging population, and increasing the number of economically active people (Latosiewicz, Kozicki, Tomaszewski, 2025, pp. 81-93). In many industries, such as construction, transport, and agriculture, workers from Ukraine have become indispensable to maintaining economic stability.

## **1. Analysis of the literature on the subject of research**

Migrants are now an indispensable element of the economies of European Union member states, and their role in social and economic systems is growing year by year. Most member states are facing an aging population (Nosarzewska, 2020), low birth rates, and labour shortages in many economic sectors. In such circumstances, migrants become not only a support but also a prerequisite for maintaining economic and social stability. The example of refugees from Ukraine who arrived in the European Union after February 2022 (Lesiecki, 2022; Dąbkowska, 2023) perfectly illustrates the significant and complex impact of migration on economic development, the functioning of the labour market, the education system, science and business.

The influx of people from Ukraine following the outbreak of the war was the largest migration crisis in Europe since World War II (Krawiel, 2022). Millions of people, primarily women and children, crossed the borders of the European Union seeking refuge. Poland and Germany accepted the largest number of refugees, followed by the Czech Republic, France, Spain and the Scandinavian countries. Although initially this migration posed a huge organizational and humanitarian challenge, it gradually began to bring tangible economic benefits. In many EU countries, people from Ukraine entered the labour market very quickly, often taking on jobs for which there were shortages of local workers. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany and the Netherlands, refugees began to strengthen the service, construction, logistics, social welfare, agriculture, catering and trade sectors. In this way, they helped alleviate the effects of labour shortages, which were already a fundamental problem in many industries by 2022 (Emic Foundation, 2025).

Migrants also contribute to economic growth and increased national income (UNHCR, 2025). Their work, consumption, and taxes contribute to the budgets of member states. According to analyses by the European Commission, the OECD, and national economic institutes, the influx of refugees from Ukraine had a positive impact on GDP growth in most EU countries. Although initially it required significant expenditures on housing, education, healthcare, and social benefits, in the long run those costs are offset by revenues from taxes and contributions from those who take up employment. That is particularly evident in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Germany (Bank.pl, 2025). The presence of migrants helped maintain production, increase turnover in trade and services, and prevent productivity declines.

Another crucial aspect is the impact of migration on science and business. Many scientists, lecturers, IT specialists, engineers, and students have arrived in Europe alongside refugees from Ukraine. European universities, research institutes, and technology companies have gained access to qualified personnel who bring innovative ideas, experience, and innovative potential. Thousands of Ukrainian students continue their studies at EU universities, and hundreds of scientists participate in international

research projects, particularly in the fields of engineering, computer science, energy, and medicine. In the business sphere, migrants have increased the number of newly established companies, many of which operate in the service, food, transportation, and technology sectors. Migration has, therefore, become a factor in the revival of entrepreneurship and the diversification of local economies (Konarzewski, 2025).

Migration also had an impact on the labour market and unemployment. Contrary to the concerns of some in the society, the influx of refugees did not lead to an increase in unemployment in EU countries. On the contrary, unemployment rates remained at record lows in most countries, as refugees filled gaps in sectors experiencing labour shortages. In Poland and the Czech Republic, where the labour market had already been tight, migrants helped maintain employment stability, and in Germany, they offset the outflow of labour associated with an aging population (Fejfer, 2025). Over time, the number of people taking up jobs commensurate with their qualifications has also increased, boosting productivity and reducing the risk of economic marginalization.

The phenomenon of migration also has a significant social dimension. It enriches the demographic structures of host countries and introduces new cultural and linguistic patterns, but at the same time requires integration efforts (Kulas, 2023). The best results are achieved by combining openness with practical support: language learning, facilitating the recognition of qualifications, and assistance in finding work and housing. Migrants become an integral part of society, contributing to social, economic, and cultural development.

Migrants, and especially refugees from Ukraine after 2022, have a huge and multidimensional impact on the functioning of European Union countries. They fuel key economic sectors, increase national income, support the development of science and entrepreneurship, and contribute to the stabilization of the labour market. Migration, of course, causes challenges. It requires investment in integration, education, and housing, but in the long term, it is a beneficial and necessary phenomenon. Europe, grappling with labour shortages and an aging population, needs migrants to maintain its economic growth, innovative capacity, and social cohesion. A responsible migration and integration policy not only minimizes potential tensions but also allows the refugee crisis to be turned into an opportunity for the development and renewal of the European labour market and human capital (Umiński, Samołyk, Piłat et al., 2025).

Migration, while bringing many social and economic benefits, also poses specific threats that can impact the stability of European Union member states. Those threats most often concern the social, economic, cultural and internal security spheres. The scale and nature of such threats depend primarily on the size of the influx of migrants, the pace of their integration, and the ability of the state to effectively respond to new challenges (Jakobson, 2022).

One of the most significant threats is the strain on social and economic systems. A large influx of migrants in a brief period of time can overwhelm housing, education, and healthcare infrastructure. Receiving countries must bear significant costs of living, housing, education, and social assistance, which burdens public budgets in the initial phase of migration. In countries with limited resources, it can lead to financial strain and even a decline in the quality of services for citizens (Llanos-Antczak, 2019).

Another challenge is the risk of increasing social tensions. Rapid demographic changes, cultural, religious, and linguistic differences can lead to misunderstandings, lack of acceptance, and a sense of insecurity among segments of the host society. In extreme cases, it can foster the development of xenophobic attitudes, populism and political radicalization. The lack of effective integration of migrants increases the risk of social enclaves and marginalization, which, consequently, hinders coexistence and fosters conflicts based on nationality or economic factors (Integrated Educational Platform, 2025).

From the perspective of internal security, migration can pose threats related to illegal border crossing, human trafficking, smuggling, and the activities of organized criminal groups exploiting migration routes (Jawor, 2023). In rare cases, there is also the risk of infiltration by individuals associated with extremist activities, which requires constant monitoring and cooperation from security services. Although such cases are rare, their very existence can impact the sense of insecurity and public mood.

Economic threats are also worth mentioning. In some regions, a large influx of foreign workers can cause temporary tensions in the labour market, especially in low-wage sectors, leading to a decline in wages or competition for jobs. At the same time, some migrants, due to language or formal barriers, may remain outside the labour market, increasing the risk of structural unemployment and straining the social system (EWL, 2025).

Cultural and identity challenges are also significant. Migration affects the structure of societies, introducing new cultural and religious patterns. In countries with strong national and religious traditions, it can lead to concerns about the loss of cultural identity. The lack of intercultural dialogue and education in that area contributes to the perpetuation of stereotypes and distrust between communities (Siciarek, 2025).

Migrants might pose a variety of threats to European Union countries, primarily in the social, economic, and internal security spheres. However, those threats stem not from their presence alone, but from the insufficient capacity of states to effectively integrate, manage the influx of people and build mutual trust. Migration becomes a threat only when accompanied by a lack of coherent policy, social dialogue and institutional support. Therefore, the key to reducing such a risk is pursuing a sound migration policy based on solidarity and responsibility that combines the protection of citizens' security with respect for human rights and the utilization of migrants' potential for the development of Europe (Opar, 2024).

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, most European countries launched special assistance programs for refugees under temporary protection. Poland and Germany became the main migration destinations, but differences in benefits and access to public services meant that the situation of refugees in those countries differed (European Commission, 2025).

In Poland, refugees from Ukraine receive temporary protection and a special PESEL number (UKR), which grants them legal residence and access to numerous benefits on terms similar to those available to Polish citizens. They can access public healthcare, the labour market, the education system and family benefits. The most important of these are the “Family 800+” program, which provides 800 PLN per month for each child; the “Good Start” program (gov.pl, 2025) worth 300 PLN for school supplies, family care capital and nursery subsidies. Initially, the system was totally open, but since 2024, the Polish authorities have introduced more restrictive rules. Cash benefits will gradually be linked to adults’ professional activity and children’s attendance at Polish schools. The goal is to encourage refugees to integrate and take up employment, while simultaneously reducing passive reliance on social assistance. Despite the tightening of the rules, Poland still provides basic social security, access to municipal housing, psychological and educational support and the system itself is financed both from the state budget and EU funds (Office for Foreigners, 2023).

In Germany, the approach was somewhat different from the outset. As of June 2022, refugees from Ukraine have been covered by the “Bürgergeld” (Sozial Plattform, 2023), a citizenship benefit system that is part of social security law (SGB II). That means they receive the same benefits as unemployed German citizens. A single person receives €563 per month for living expenses, with the state also covering the costs of housing, heating, and health insurance. Such amounts are, of course, higher for families. The Jobcenter also offers language courses (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2025), vocational training and job search support, making the German system one of the most comprehensive in Europe. Although there has been discussion in Germany in recent years about the need to reduce social spending, the federal government has maintained the rates unchanged in 2025, citing the need to ensure decent living conditions and effective integration for refugees.

Comparing the two countries, it is clear that in Poland, benefits are lower but better integrated with the family and education systems, while in Germany, the level of cash benefits and full coverage of living costs make it a much more attractive place to live.

It is therefore not surprising that in 2025, Germany became the main destination for secondary migration within the European Union. According to data from the European Commission and the German Ministry of the Interior, over 1,2 million Ukrainian citizens under temporary protection reside there, the highest number in

the entire EU. Poland remains in the second place, but some refugees who initially found refuge in Poland moved to Germany in search of higher benefits and a more stable labour market (European Council, 2024).

In summary, the support system for refugees from Ukraine across Europe is diverse. Poland provides broad, but increasingly conditional, access to benefits, focusing on integration through work and education. Germany, on the other hand, offers the most comprehensive and financially advantageous aid package, making it the most desirable destination for refugees. In other countries on the continent, the prevailing trend is to limit the amount of benefits and increase requirements for beneficiaries, ensuring that assistance is temporary and promotes independence.

## **2. Multidimensional analysis of data on the number of migrants benefiting from temporary protection in selected European Union countries**

The research began with the analysis of data on the number of people under temporary protection in European countries at the end of each month from March 2022 to August 2025 (see Fig. 1). The data in the chart reflects the scale of the influx of refugees from Ukraine who sought refuge in European Union and associated countries after the outbreak of war. The largest numbers of people under protection were recorded in Germany, Poland, and France. In Germany, the number exceeded 1,2 million in August 2025, while in Poland it was slightly under one million during the same period. In other countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, these figures are much lower, typically under 200,000, except for the Czech Republic, where they reach around 400,000. Since the end of 2023, there has been a visible stabilization in the number of people benefiting from temporary protection, indicating that after the initial migration crisis, the reception and integration systems in most countries have reached relative balance. The exception was Germany, where a sharp decline was recorded in July 2024, followed by a gradual increase until August 2025.

Such a phenomenon has a significant impact on the social security of both respective Member States and the European Union as a whole. Countries hosting the largest numbers of refugees were forced to rapidly adapt their social welfare, labour market, education, and healthcare systems. In the short term, it posed enormous organizational and financial challenges. Demand for social housing, cash benefits, school and preschool places and psychological or medical support increased. In countries such as Poland and Germany, additional social workers, teachers, and translators had to be hired, placing a significant burden on public administration (Ministry of National Education, 2022).




Fig. 1. Categorized line chart of the number of people from Ukraine under temporary protection in European countries at the end of each month from March 2022 to August 2025

Source: own study based on data obtained from: Eurostat, 2025

From a social perspective, the massive influx of people has created new integration challenges. Many countries have identified the need to develop language programs, vocational training, and initiatives to facilitate refugees' entry into the labour market (Office for Foreigners, 2025). In their absence, the risk of social exclusion and tensions between local communities and newcomers increases. On the other hand, a well-executed integration policy can bring tangible benefits. Those who settle for longer periods can strengthen the labour market, increase consumption and stimulate the development of local economies, especially in countries struggling with aging populations and labour shortages.

At the European Union level, the refugee crisis has highlighted the need for a more coherent and solidarity-based migration policy. Past experience has shown that responsibility for accepting refugees is unevenly distributed. The heaviest burden falls on a few countries, such as Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic. The lack of a uniform mechanism for relocating individuals under temporary protection creates political tensions and hinders effective cooperation within the community. At the same time, however, the EU's response was significantly faster and more organized than during the 2015 migration crisis. The implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive allowed refugees to quickly secure legal residence, access to the labour market and public services, significantly reducing administrative chaos (Szymańska, 2022).

From a social security perspective, the long-term presence of large numbers of refugees requires a balanced policy that combines humanitarian, economic and social aspects. Preventive measures related to counteracting discrimination, ensuring equal opportunities and strengthening intercultural integration have become particularly important in host countries. Increased spending on internal security has also become essential to counter potential threats stemming from social tensions and disinformation.

In the long term, this situation could contribute to strengthening solidarity within the European Union if Member States are able to act together and share responsibility. At the same time, it is a test of the Union's ability to respond to humanitarian crises and maintain a balance between humanitarian values and social security. Ultimately, the experience could lead to the strengthening of community structures, the development of common asylum and migration policies and the construction of a more resilient, integrated civil protection system in Europe.

Then, for research purposes, data on the number of people benefiting from temporary protection in Germany and Poland from March 2022 to August 2025 was analyzed in detail.

Figure 2 compares the number of people benefiting from temporary protection in Poland and Germany from March 2022 to August 2025. Both countries are among the largest beneficiaries of the influx of refugees from Ukraine after the outbreak of the war, but they played distinct roles in this process – Poland as a country of first contact and temporary shelter and Germany as a destination country, offering long-term integration and residence opportunities (Bankier.pl, 2023). In the initial period of the conflict, in the spring of 2022, Poland received the largest wave of refugees. The number of people under temporary protection there grew rapidly, reaching over 1,2 million in mid-2022. At the same time, Germany recorded significantly lower figures, in the range of 500,000-700,000 people, due to the longer registration process and delays in the activation of administrative and social systems.




Fig. 2. Categorized bar chart of the number of people from Ukraine under temporary protection in Germany and Poland from March 2022 to August 2025

Source: own study based on data obtained from: Eurostat, 2025

The situation began to change in 2023. In Poland, after a massive organizational and social effort, a slow decline in the number of refugees began to be observed. Some returned to Ukraine, while others moved further west in search of more stable living conditions. At the same time, Germany saw a steady increase in the number of people under temporary protection. The country gradually assumed a leadership role in the long-term integration of refugees, offering extensive social support, access to the labour market, education and a comprehensive German language program. Since the second half of 2023, the number of people under protection in Germany surpassed that of Poland and continued its upward trend, stabilizing at around 1,4 million in 2025. At the same time, the number of refugees in Poland remained at around 900,000.

The data reveals two distinct models of response to the refugee crisis. Poland reacted rapidly in the first phase of the war, mobilizing vast social and organizational resources that allowed it to immediately accommodate millions of fleeing people. Support was largely provided at grassroots by citizens, local governments, non-governmental organizations and churches. However, over time, faced with overburdened housing, education, and healthcare infrastructure, as well as limited financial resources, the role of Poland transformed. It remained a key center of humanitarian aid and a transit point, but most refugees began seeking more stable lives in other European Union countries.

Germany, on the other hand, adopted a strategy of long-term support and integration. With significantly greater financial and administrative capabilities, the country implemented comprehensive integration programs encompassing access to the labour market, education and healthcare. Federal and state authorities leveraged the experience of previous migration waves, particularly those from 2015-2016, allowing them to effectively accommodate large numbers of people (Grün, Hille, Hänel, 2025). As a result, Germany became the primary destination for refugees from Ukraine seeking permanent residence and social stability.

From a social security perspective, such a situation has wide-ranging implications. In Poland, the influx of refugees contributed to a short-term strain on the social benefits system, housing and education markets, but also stimulated the economy. Many people from Ukraine found work, which helped alleviate labour shortages in certain sectors, such as construction, services and agriculture. In the long term, Poland gained valuable experience in managing migration crises, although challenges related to refugee integration and adaptation remain.

In Germany, the impact of migration was more complex. On the one hand, the increase in refugee numbers increased pressure on the state budget and the social welfare system, while on the other, it helped partially alleviate labour shortages in the labour market. Refugee integration became an essential element of domestic policy and the federal government consistently invested in language and vocational programs. Refugees increasingly began to take up employment and participate in social life, strengthening the long-term stability of the country.

At the European Union level, Poland and Germany played a key role in maintaining European cohesion and solidarity in terms of the largest refugee crisis since World War II. Their cooperation, despite differing approaches, was the foundation for the effective operation of the entire community. Poland provided immediate protection and humanitarian aid, while Germany created a model for long-term integration. The experiences of those two countries demonstrate that effective responding to migration crises requires cooperation, shared responsibility and mutual support within the European Union. At the same time, this crisis highlighted the need to strengthen common migration and asylum policies, so that the Union can respond faster, more efficiently and more evenly among Member States in the future.

In summary, Poland and Germany, despite their differing strategies, have become pillars of the European temporary protection system. Poland demonstrated its ability to react quickly and show solidarity in terms of crisis, while Germany confirmed the strength of its institutions and integration system. Together, they contributed to maintaining social and political stability in Europe and their experiences offer important lessons for the future of the community as far as managing migration and social security is concerned.

## **Summary and conclusions**

The data compiled in the article demonstrates the scale of the refugee influx following the outbreak of the war and their distribution across Europe. The largest numbers of individuals under protection reside in Germany (over 1,2 million) and Poland (just under 1 million). In other countries, those numbers are much smaller – in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, less than 200,000 and in the Czech Republic, around 400,000. Since the end of 2023, a stabilization in refugee numbers has been observed, indicating that reception and integration systems have normalized. The exception is Germany, where a decline occurred in mid-2024, after which the number of those individuals began to rise again.

Migrants impact social security, which encompasses the economic, demographic, and cultural stability of European Union countries. It is in this sphere that their presence is most felt and multidimensional. The influx of foreign populations, especially refugees from Ukraine, since February 2022 has significantly changed the structure of European societies and the functioning of their economies. Migrants are influencing the labour market, filling gaps in sectors that have been experiencing labour shortages for years – in construction, agriculture, industry, healthcare and services. In doing so, they contribute to maintaining the continuity of production, economic growth and the stability of pension systems. Their work, taxes and consumption support economic development and increase the economic security of entire societies.

At the same time, they also play a significant role in the demographic security of Europe. Most EU countries are experiencing an aging population and a decline in the working-age population. The presence of migrants, particularly younger ones, mitigates the effects of such a phenomenon by increasing the number of economically active people and helping maintain the balance of social security systems. That makes member states more resilient to the challenges stemming from unfavorable demographic changes.

The impact of migration is also visible in the cultural and social dimensions. The emergence of new communities leads to greater linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity, which, on one hand, challenges social cohesion, but on the other enriches the social and cultural life of the receiving countries. In countries with active integration and education policies, migrants become part of society, bringing new skills, experiences, and innovation. In countries where integration is difficult, however, the risk of exclusion and social tensions arises.

Migration also indirectly impacts political and international security, forcing the European Union to deepen cooperation and develop a common migration policy. Countries that effectively manage the influx of migrants strengthen their internal stability and position within the Union. Migration, thus, becomes not only a challenge but also a component of building European resilience and solidarity.

In summary, migrants have the greatest impact on the social security of European Union countries, simultaneously influencing their economies, demographics, culture, and social relations. Their presence might pose both a challenge and an opportunity, depending on how well countries leverage their potential and ensure effective integration. In the long term, migration, if managed well, strengthens social, economic and cultural stability of Europe, making it more resilient to future crises.

Financial support for refugees from Ukraine in Europe is a crucial factor from both a humanitarian and sociopolitical perspective, impacting the security of host countries. However, the importance of this support should be understood more broadly than just in terms of money paid to refugees.

On the one hand, financial benefits are essential for refugees to function with dignity and stability in their new country. Those who have fled war often arrive destitute, and host countries have a moral and legal obligation to provide them with basic living conditions: shelter, food, healthcare and education for their children. A properly designed support system helps prevent poverty, homelessness and social exclusion phenomena that could, in the long term, lead to social tensions and the marginalization of entire groups of migrants.

On the other hand, the level of benefits also has the strategic significance. Countries with higher levels of financial support, such as Germany or Belgium, attract larger numbers of refugees, including those who initially sought refuge in other countries, such as Poland or the Czech Republic. That leads to the phenomenon of secondary migration within the European Union, which in practice leads to an

uneven distribution of the aid burden and creates tensions between governments. Some countries fear that overly generous benefits could act as a “social magnet,” increasing the influx of people who are not necessarily most in need of protection but are driven by economic considerations.

The national and social security aspects are crucial here. If the support system is not well-balanced, it can generate frustration in the host society, especially when citizens perceive that refugees receive excessive privileges compared to low-income local residents. In many Western European countries, tensions over social policies towards foreigners have fueled populist and anti-immigration political movements. Excessive budgetary pressure, especially during an economic crisis, might, consequently, impact political stability and the public sense of security.

On the other hand, the lack or limitation of assistance also poses risks. Refugees who do not receive sufficient financial support may be exposed to poverty, illegal employment, exploitation or crime, which also negatively impacts public security. Therefore, the safest solution for both refugees and the host country is a balanced model: moderate cash benefits combined with intensive support in finding a job, learning the language and social integration.

In practice, it means that the financial support system must be linked to obligations. In Poland, there is a growing trend of linking assistance to professional and educational activity, which is intended to prevent the formation of groups solely dependent on benefits. Germany, on the other hand, despite offering higher benefits, pursues an extremely strict professional activation policy. The Jobcenter requires beneficiaries to participate in courses and training.

In summary, financial support for refugees is a key factor for both humanitarian and political reasons. It helps ensure stability, reduces the risk of social dysfunction and promotes integration. However, excessive or inappropriate support can create tensions, burden budgets and undermine the sense of security in the host society. Therefore, what matters most is not the amount of benefits themselves, but their sensible link to integration policies, professional activation and the responsibility of both the state and the refugees.

To capitalize on migration in the future, a consistent and long-term integration policy is essential. Member States should facilitate migrants’ access to the labour market, education and language learning, recognize professional qualifications and support entrepreneurship among refugees. It is also crucial to ensure adequate housing, healthcare and psychological care, as well as promote social dialogue to reduce the risk of exclusion and cultural tensions. The European Union ought to continue to work together and fund integration policies to ensure that the burden of assistance is shared evenly among Member States.

Professionally managed, migration from Ukraine might bring long-term benefits to Europe. It will strengthen its economy, redress demographic shortcomings and increase social resilience. However, it is crucial that such a process is conducted in

an organized manner, based on solidarity and mutual trust. Then, migration will not become a threat, but an opportunity for development, integration and strengthening of the European community.

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